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时间的本质,兼论光速是因果律的限速

回复 15# 未来 的帖子

佛教讲因缘果报,是说事物的显现发生是在因缘成熟,具备了发生的条件,就会呈现如是的果报。
事件前后的合理性不需要人的意识去分别,要不你说说什么叫着“意外”?

微观粒子、随机概率这些物理学名相都是科学家观测的对象,这不是佛陀所要教的,佛所要讲的是一切事物名相的本来,因此具有正见的佛弟子应该知道这不是究竟的东西,不是说科学家的观测不对,而是说他们还不能洞彻真相。

你是不是跟他们一样呢?
好人难做,也要做。

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回复 16# 阿達 的帖子

1、事件先后顺序是不需要人的意识去分别。只是先后顺序能不能安立的问题,详见首帖。
2、过去,佛教一直是在发展的,从原始佛教到部派佛教,就是因为世俗世界人们的认知在不断提升,佛教理论便与时俱进。唯独这个时代佛教理论停滞不前,固步自封了。
3、科学从未说过自己究竟,相反总是认识到自己远远地不究竟。但是科学越来越展现出强大的说服力。在现代科学面前,往圣说得某些话有可能站不住脚了。这也是为什么理论要跟进的原因。形而上的究竟毕竟始终只是自认的。

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回复 17# 未来 的帖子

1. 无须去安立不安立 !

在人的观测里有所谓的“随机概率”。“随机” 也就无从找出事发源头,对于这样的事件通常是不了了之。 因此事件的顺序是事件的顺序,没有所谓的安立不安立。

人为什么一定要介入事件的情况里呢?好比一件车祸的发生,二部车子相撞了,车子毁坏不堪,本来情况就是这么简单,但是二部车子的主人下车了,然后理论开始了,车祸本来是一件事的,可是接下来的对错是非都是人的意识分别在发生作用。
“干预”在旁人来看已经把事件一分为二,可能四或更多。。。
这就好像你在针对事件说有无先后顺序,再来又说能不能安立的情形一样。

2.  这也是你在对事件做干扰,把事件弄的更复杂。

3.用科学来论证佛说就好像用一小杯的水来浇泼炎热的火焰一样。

   不要轻率的论证他人的说话! 有这必要吗?

[ 本帖最后由 阿達 于 2010-7-22 00:32 编辑 ]
好人难做,也要做。

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回复 18# 阿達 的帖子

1、人观测了就不随机了,就确定了,随机事件就塌缩成既成事件。人不观测便是随机的,并非是因为找不到源头,而是确实是随机的。参见《电子知道你在偷窥,月亮知道你在看它吗?》一帖,以加深理解。比方说篮球场上有一个篮球,你不看它,它在篮球场上任一可能的位置,并非是说它在某一确定位置,你不知道,而是它根本就是在任一可能位置,它没有塌缩,在篮球场上它无所不在。当你看它的时候,在你看它的这一瞬,它立即塌缩到一个确定位置。人观测微观粒子就是这种情况。如果理解成事实上在某时某刻粒子有一个确定位置,只不过是人不知道,那是理解错了。

2、在二元世界,人无时不刻都在介入各种各样的事件。
3、真正的佛说是无言之说,佛什么都没说,论证啥,怎么论证?凡有言说,都有保质期。旧的保质期到了,新的跟上,仅此而已。

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回复 19# 冰水 的帖子

佛教是佛教,禅是禅。两不相干。你没搞清楚佛教和禅的关系,所以这样发问。

请到网上搜索守培法师写的《不与万法为侣禅宗论》,这篇文章把佛教和禅的关系讲得比较透彻。

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告訴冰水學長

這個未來師兄,總在自己認為對的方向追求。
個人的感想是他走的這個方向,已經離開了佛陀的本懷(諸法從緣起),總是從各方面將合乎自己見解的(或自解經意)引進來,強說佛法。主要是認為世間最終還是有個不變永恆之物(識)。

你問:「释迦佛陀的证悟是究竟的吗?」
他答:「佛教是佛教,禅是禅。两不相干。你没搞清楚佛教和禅的关系,所以这样发问。」
離開人能理解的範疇太遠,難解!禪為何會忽然彈出來呢?

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回复 22# takwantang 的帖子

1、佛陀是讲三世因果和轮回的,人死不是生命的终结。你去问问大小乘,有谁否认这个?你连这个都否定了,谈缘起或谈佛法有什么意义?这一点是针对你个人的。至于你对我讲的永恒不变,一直是理解有误的。我讲的永恒不变,就是永恒变。详述请见《论真如可熏》。
2、佛教是事物之一,到目前为止只有2500多年的历史。任何事物都是无常的。佛教没有建立的时候,就没禅了?佛教和究竟证悟有什么关系?释迦佛陀是发现了真理实相,而不是发明了真理实相。真理实相如如不动,不因人的证悟发现而生,也不因人的证悟发现而灭。所以我推荐《不与万法为侣禅宗论》,希望大家在佛教和禅的关系上,产生些观点认同。
3、真正的佛说是无言之说,佛什么都没说,论证啥,怎么论证?事物在不断变化的,世尊当初以手指月,弟子们皆得月之所在。你今天仍旧朝着这个曾经的手指的方向望过去,月亮早已经在另一个地方了。舟在行,世间在变,刻舟岂能求剑?连佛教的理论一直在发展的历史事实都不尊重,还想谈什么?
4、给幼儿园、小学、中学、大学的学生讲述相同的道理,讲述的语言、方式、角度都是不同的。从古至今,人类的认知犹如从幼儿园、小学、中学、发展到大学。课本却停留在小学或中学程度,这是难以想象的。过去没人会问的问题,在今天就会有很多人问。在过去不需要解释的问题,今天就需要花大力气去解释。你希望别人不要问,不要想,那是一厢情愿。佛教讲究闻思修。过去一闻一思就想通并认同的问题,放到今天的认知背景下,不一定能想通认同了。所以你给佛教徒提供的闻思材料要跟上!否则很难在闻思的基础上起修。科学越发展,这个趋势就越是显而易见,佛教的理论就越是需要跟进。

[ 本帖最后由 未来 于 2010-7-22 14:27 编辑 ]

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師兄說:佛陀是讲三世因果和轮回的,人死不是生命的终结。
如果是指當我死去時,卻非我生命的終結。這點我是不能同意的!因其中含有一個不滅的(x),但如果是指我死,而非其他生命的終結,那卻是必然的道理。
也不用問任何人,只要問自己誠懇的心就可以了。為何要誠懇的心呢?因為這個心很會騙人,當騙得自己相信有個天堂,有個全能的上帝後,自己就會高高興興地相信死後的自己能到天堂去。
關於這個識、我的問題,在年初Chzhuang師兄轉了個文章,是個老外的見解,我覺得這個老外說得很有見地!
師兄的英語好,所以再貼上來供參考。

老外思想论坛也在谈佛教无我思想
Nonexistence of Self
By Paul

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The idea of a self is fundamental, yet strangely inscrutable. "I exist" seems an obvious truth, but who is the "I"? Is there a single distinct "I" experiencing existence, or is it unfair to say that the "I" is distinct from the experience? Is it sensible to imagine there not being a self? Buddhist philosophy asserts that the conception of a separate self having the experiences is a mistake. Contradicting the assertions of the Samkhya and Yoga philosophies, Buddhists argue that the self is nothing more than an arbitrary label for a collection of parts.
In the view of Samkhya and Yoga, the self is an undeniable fact. Where there is a scene, it is argued, there is a witness. Where there is an observation, there is an observer. Where there is something known, there is a knower. The mind isn't properly described as being the self, for it's clearly known. Thoughts are all observations of their own sort, as they must pass before consciousness. Consciousness is of thoughts, therefore consciousness cannot be the thoughts themselves according to Samkhya and Yoga. In the Yoga-Sutra this argument is given against the mind being the self: "Whatever objects color the mind, that object becomes known. That which becomes known is an object. That which is not thus known is purusa and is unknown" (482). Anything which is known must have a knower, so the known mind must be known by the true self. What's left over after the options of the self being the body or the mind are dismissed is a self which is a pure principle of observation -- consciousness in itself. This self, called purusa, is the eternal observer before whom temporary thoughts pass. We have a difficulty in that the self cannot be known (it being the knower of any knowledge, always the subject and never an object), but confidence that the self must be there since it's been logically derived.
The Buddhist rejects the self, preferring to say that it's no more than a label for a collection. Just as we label objects in the world around us arbitrarily, we invent an arbitrary label with the word "self" that has no reality beyond the parts. "Chariot" is a word we use to keep track of a conglomeration of descriptions: wheels, axles, reins, yoke, banner-staff, goading-stick, pole, et cetera. It isn't proper to say that these things unite to become the chariot because there's no real unification, the parts remain only the parts, it's just we who imagine some sort of unity by use of the word "chariot" as the unifier. Objectively there's nothing that "chariot" adds to what's there compared to if we didn't treat it as though it were unified... all the parts are simply all the parts, our label adds nothing. So it is as well with the self. Nagesana explains this with reference to his own being in the Milindapanha: "Nagesana is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body... brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, the predispositions, and consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no ego here to be found" (284). The self is not form, not sensation, not perception, not predispositions, not consciousness... nor is it something else, nor is it the unification. The self is not to be found, it's only the invented label which is imagined to mean something but actually adds nothing to the picture beyond what was already there.
The Samkyha and Yoga philosophers may object to the fundamental ideas of the Buddhist conception as being incoherent, but must establish that their own view as more coherent if the objections are to be effective. The Buddhist is denying, it would seem, the most obvious facts of the world: that there are things in it and someone perceiving it. The existence of objects being known is proof of the existence of the knower, the objects cannot be known without a knowing subject existing. Patanjali says of the mind, "It is not self-illuminating, being the knowable" (482). This proves there must be a self, as the fact of the knowable means something must be doing the knowing. The Buddhist seems simply self-contradictory, uttering such nonsense as "The Path exists, but not the traveler on it" (289). If someone is traveling the path, then the traveler on the path must exist, and to say otherwise is surely nonsense. The Samkhya philosopher, however, is in the situation of asserting the existence of something which is defined as unknown (because it's the knower) and impossible to experience (because it's the experiencer). Many philosophers would argue that it's never proper to claim to existence of something which by definition can never be conceived of -- if you see the tip of an iceberg perhaps you can deduce the rest, but if you have no sample at all of what sort of thing it is then you have no business asserting it. The Samkhya idea of the purusa, then, cannot be trusted based on appeals to intuition unless there's some sort of sample of what it could be -- otherwise it might be more reasonable to say that the intuition that there's a subject for every object only applies to the experiences within the mind and is misapplied when used on the mind itself... for after all, we derived the intuition only from sense experiences. Perhaps Patanjali sees these objections, for Yoga provides an attempt at showing a way to verify the existence of the self. In the Yoga-Sutra, Patanjali believes he's showing a process through which the true purusa can be experienced in itself, the method to have the subject without any object. But how coherent, exactly, is the idea of self-observation? Surely it's the impossibility of self-observation that motivated the idea of an observing unobservable self to begin with, and if we're willing to assert self-observation we might as well assert the mind as doing it. The idea that subject and object require each other was just moments ago being used to refute the Buddhist, so how then can we suddenly moving to talking about a subject by itself? If there can be no object without a subject, how can there be a subject without an object... how can there be any way to distinguish one to say that it exists, without the other being there to distinguish it? Logically, the consciousness in itself would have to be either total nothingness or an experience of another meta-self experiencer (which would lead to an infinite homuncular regress). It would seem then that the objections to Buddhism by Samkhya and Yoga philosophy are not especially strong, in view of how their alternative to the Buddhist falls victim to some similar attacks -- yet it remains worthwhile to see if the Buddhist can deal with the objections more easily, in order to determine if the views will be stuck on equally questionable footing.
The Buddhist position can be clarified to show how it sidesteps the problems it's accused of. The denial of self is not a denial that there are perceptions and consciousness, rather it's a denial of unity and a denial of absoluteness. There is a chariot so far as common talk goes, and it would seem nonsensical to deny that there's a chariot -- but we must remember that we're addressing the idea of a unified real absolute chariot, not just asking if the situation has arisen where in our language we're supposed to say "chariot." There is a chariot there, but only in a relational sense -- the relation of the parts to each other. It's entirely arbitrary to try to call that set of relations a unified whole, as it would be just as easy to extend it out and call the entire world a chariot. There's nothing in the relations themselves which says how many or what kind of relations to include in some sort of absolute unified whole... there's nothing in the parts of a chariot that says "I'm part of a chariot." The unified chariot, the absolute chariot, does not exist -- it's only what the senses and mind structures cause the mind to imagine. This carries over again to talking about the self -- the thesis in not that nothing exists, it's that things are only there in a relational sense (with arbitrary and fuzzy boundaries) rather than an absolute sense. The chariot is the expression of the relation of parts, and so is the self the expression of the relation of parts. This is emphasized in the Visuddhi-magga: "When we come to examine the parts one by one we discover that in the absolute sense there is no tree; in exactly the same way the words 'living entity' and 'ego' are but a mode of expression for the presence of the five attachment groups, but when we come to examine the elements of being one by one, we discover that in the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as 'I am,' or 'I'; in other words, that in the absolute sense there is only name and form" (285). Our attempts to express an absolute reality of self are mistaken, for there is nothing there except exactly what's there. There is no unity, only relations which we hopelessly attempt to turn into unity. It's not that we're wrong to talk of things existing, it's that we're wrong to think we mean something absolute or unified by it, for on close inspection everything we call an object (including the self) is no more than relations.
The critic may still object that the Buddhist hasn't offered an account of how experiences exist. To this, the Buddhist may reply that experiences are made up of skandhas, skandhas being essentially aggregates or bundles. The five skandhas are form, sensation, perception/cognition, predispositions, consciousness. The most important as far as analyzing why experience seems to be as it seems to be is the consciousness. The consciousness (vijnana skandha) is the skandha which splits things into subject and object. This occurs when a sense organ (brain included) comes into contact with something -- it's here that the duality of experience is added. Consciousness creates a split into experiencer and experience, a split which is not real beyond consciousness. Normally we think of experience being created by subject and object, because consciousness forces things into such description. In actuality, says the Buddhist, both the subject and the object are aspects of experience. The subject/object distinction is created by the consciousness aspect of experience, rather than being the reality of the way things are as the Samkhya or Yoga philosopher would have it. Samkhya would have a self sitting in a movie theater watching life on the screen. The Buddhist would have nothing but the experiences on the screen, with no theater or viewer, and for that matter no screen. The Buddhist, instead of appealing to the necessity of a subject for every object that seems so natural, says that the subject/object distinction is illusory (an aspect of experience itself) and so eliminates the problem of looking for a self.
For the Buddhist, the knowing that goes on is only relational, parts relating to other parts. By avoiding the absolute sense of something being known, the Buddhist also avoids the implication of an absolute self. When the mind knows something, that's just a pattern of relations with no absolutes involved. There is no observer of the mind, for the thoughts stand without need of any absolutes to put them in context. When subject and object are illusion and reality contains neither subject nor object, there's no need to invent a self to fill the hole of "subject".
The nature of the self is a problem that has plagued philosophy from the earliest times. The Buddhist argues that this problem is a psychological problem -- the feeling of a need to find something that isn't there. If the self seems strangely inscrutable, that's because there's nothing there to examine. The quest for the unified self is doomed by the simple fact that there's nothing more there than what's there, there is no unity. If the subject/object distinction is truly illusory, then our intuitions of separateness and unified nature of a self opposed to a world are only a part of the nature of experience, and not an actual reality beyond.

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1、外语没功夫看的。
2、要不你等论坛上有5个佛教徒同意了你的观点再讨论。

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